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Corruption at the Intersection of
Business and Government: The OECD
Convention, Supply-Side Corruption,
and Canada’s Anti-Corruption Efforts to
Date
MILOS BARUTCISKI & SABRINA A. BANDALI*
Over the last twenty years, international and regional conventions have been concluded to
combat the corruption of public officials. Part I of the paper explains the genesis of international
anti-corruption law and its focus on the “supply-side” of bribery transactions, drawing on
the negotiating history and the experience of practitioners involved in the development of
international anti-corruption law. Parts II and III examine Canada’s implementation of its
international obligations and its enforcement record to date. Part IV of the paper concludes
with an analysis of the challenges faced by Canadian businesses and the limitations of the
focus on supply-side of bribery transactions.
Depuis une vingtaine d’années, des conventions internationales et régionales ont été
conclues afin de lutter contre la corruption d’agents publics. S’inspirant de l’historique
des négociations et de l’expérience des spécialistes qui les ont mises au point, la première
partie de l’article traite de la genèse des lois internationales de lutte contre la corruption
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et du fait qu’elles ciblent le « côté de l’offre » des transactions entachées de corruption. La
seconde et la troisième parties examinent la mise en œuvre par le Canada de ses obligations
internationales et l’historique de leur application à ce jour. En conclusion, la quatrième partie
de l’article analyse les défis auxquels doivent faire face les entreprises canadiennes et les
limitations du ciblage du « côté de l’offre » des transactions entachées de corruption.
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IN 1997, CANADA AND THE TWENTY-EIGHT OTHER Members of the Organisation

for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), along with five
additional countries, signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions.1 The signature and ratification of
this convention marked an important milestone in a campaign against corruption
that had been picking up momentum through the early 1990s.
The principal thrust of the campaign was to tackle supply-side corruption—
that is, to counter corruption by cutting off the supply of bribe payments.
1.

17 December 1997, 37 ILM 1 (entered into force 15 February 1999) [OECD Convention].
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Although all countries prohibit bribery of their own officials, prior to the entry
into force of the OECD Convention on 15 February 1999, the United States was
the only country in the world that expressly prohibited the payment of bribes to
foreign officials, as a result of the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act2
(“FCPA”) in 1977.
Since the development of the international consensus on addressing the supply
side of bribery transactions, several trends have driven multinational enterprises
to focus on anti-corruption compliance. The increase in corporate focus on
these issues has in turn encouraged the emergence of specialized anti-corruption
compliance professionals, investigators, lawyers, and other advisors. While the
focus on the supply side has produced significant improvements in training, internal
controls, and corporate compliance generally, it has also created significant direct
and indirect costs for companies,3 which can quickly become difficult to control
or make proportional to the corruption risk at issue. In addition, even the most
robust compliance regimes can be circumvented if the incentives are high enough
and circumventers devote sufficient effort. So long as the efforts to constrain
supply-side corruption are not matched by equivalent efforts on the demand side,
there will be inefficiencies and misallocation of resources both in compliance
activities and in the broader international campaign against corruption.
This article aims to explain the development and limits of the focus on
supply-side corruption from the perspective of a practitioner who participated
in the genesis and implementation of the supply-side approach. Part I explains
the origins of the international focus on the supply side of bribery transactions—
memorialized in the OECD Convention—based on process documents and
the experience of practitioners involved in the development of this approach.
Notwithstanding the broader scope of subsequent anti-corruption conventions,
such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption4 (“UNCAC”),
combating supply-side corruption remains the dominant focus of Canada’s
2.
3.

4.

15 USC tit 15 § 78m (1977) [FCPA].
Corporate anti-corruption compliance entails substantial direct and indirect costs at both
the operational day-to-day level and in the transactional deal context (i.e., mergers and
acquisitions, joint ventures, borrowing and financing, et cetera). Direct costs include the
administrative costs of maintaining compliance staff, training, monitoring and audit,
third-party due diligence, counsel and forensic investigation fees, and other costs related
to the ongoing implementation of compliance procedures. There are also substantial
indirect costs that come into play in the context of impacts on commercial negotiations,
diversion and distraction of management resources, and the costs of delay in implementing
transactions resulting from due diligence and other compliance-related activities.
31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41 (entered into force 14 December 2005) [UNCAC].
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implementation of its international anti-corruption obligations. Accordingly,
Parts II and III presents an overview of Canada’s record to date in implementing
those obligations, including the adoption of the Corruption of Foreign Public
Officials Act5 (“CFPOA”), legislative changes to the CFPOA in 2013, and the
evolution of Canadian law enforcement efforts. Part IV presents some reflections
on the limits of the OECD Convention’s current approach and suggestions for
future directions.

I. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL RULES
A. THE FOCUS ON SUPPLY-SIDE CORRUPTION (BRIBE PAYERS)

Over the last twenty years, several international and regional conventions have
been concluded to combat official corruption. These include the Inter-American
Convention against Corruption6 in 1996, the OECD Convention7 in 1997, the
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption8 in 1999, the African
Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption9 in 2009, and the
UNCAC10 in 2003. Of these, the instrument that has had the greatest impact on
international business is the OECD Convention.
Before the OECD Convention, bribing a foreign public official was not only
tolerated but was legally permissible everywhere except in the United States. In
fact, in Canada and many other jurisdictions, the cost of paying a bribe was a
deductible business expense for income tax purposes.11 This practice only changed
in 1996 as a result of an OECD Recommendation calling for the elimination
of tax deductibility for bribes.12 This Recommendation was a precursor of the
OECD Convention. In fact, the preferential tax treatment of bribes continued to
be an issue after the adoption of the OECD Convention.13
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

SC 1998, c 34 [CFPOA].
29 March 1996, OASTS No B-58 (entered into force 6 March 1997).
OECD Convention, supra note 1.
27 January 1999, Eur TS No 173 (entered into force 1 July 2002).
11 July 2003, 43 ILM 5 (entered into force 5 August 2006).
UNCAC, supra note 4.
See Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) s 67.5. This section now prohibits deducting
expenses incurred for the purpose of doing anything that would be an offence under s 3 of
the CFPOA or the domestic bribery provisions of the Criminal Code. See CFPOA, supra note
5, s 3. See also Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 121-23, 426.
12. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public
Officials, 35 ILM 1311 (11 April 1996).
13. US, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Battling International Bribery (Washington:
US Department of State, 1999) at 33 [Battling International Bribery].
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There are several reasons for the historical tolerance of foreign bribery.
The first is the predominantly territorial basis of criminal law.14 When a company
pays a bribe to a foreign official in a host country, the actus reus of the bribery
offence often occurs entirely in the host country and outside of the territorial
jurisdiction of the company’s home country laws. Accordingly, absent rules
conferring nationality-based or some other form of extraterritorial jurisdiction,
the company’s home country cannot assert adjudicative jurisdiction over the
offence. Second, the principles of international comity and sovereign equality
make it improper—or at the very least, difficult—for one country to dictate
norms of conduct for officials of another sovereign country in the foreign
sovereign’s territory. Third, both companies and governments have historically
followed a pragmatic and relativistic approach to transactions and commercial
operations in multiple jurisdictions: when in Rome, do as the Romans do.
As the scope and volume of international business has expanded, all three of
these rationales for tolerating foreign corruption have increasingly come under
criticism. International and domestic laws, standards, and commercial norms
have developed that depart from these three principles. Nonetheless, in the years
leading up to the OECD Convention, the principles of territoriality, comity, and
sovereign equality, along with pragmatic relativism, made the emergence of an
international consensus on anti-corruption far from inevitable.
1.

GENESIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION CONSENSUS

The international consensus to tackle corruption through coordinated international
efforts was the result of two parallel movements during the early 1990s. The first
came from non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), notably Transparency
International (“TI”), who were motivated by the frustration of seeing billions
of dollars in development aid being misappropriated by corrupt officials and
siphoned into offshore accounts. The second—perhaps surprisingly to some—
came from the US business community, which felt that it was at a competitive
disadvantage in international business due to the fact that its foreign competitors
did not face a legal burden equivalent to the US FCPA.
i.

ANTI-CORRUPTION AND THE NGO COMMUNITY

In the 1990s, individuals and organizations involved in international development
began to identify and publicize the harmful effects of bribery and corruption.
The most prominent NGO to engage on the issue of corruption was TI, which
14. See Libman v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 178 at 183-84, 21 DLR (4th) 174 [Libman].
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was founded in 1993 as a coalition of civil society and business that aimed to
create a global anti-corruption movement. Industry-specific organizations also
began to take action against corruption. For example, in 1995, the International
Federation of Consulting Engineers began to include anti-corruption language in
its model contracts, and in 1996, both the International Chamber of Commerce
(“ICC”) and the American Bar Association (“ABA”) published recommendations
encouraging their members to support anti-corruption activity.15
Around this same time, international development organizations and think
tanks, such as the UK’s Overseas Development Institute (“ODI”), observed greater
attention to and discussion of the possibility of tying aid funding to political
reform in developing countries, known as “political conditionality.”16 The ODI
noted that, among other things, “[the] current donor interest in questions of
governance and democracy [and] … [t]he motivation for political and institutional
reform stems from a desire to improve aid effectiveness, by preventing waste and
corruption and strengthening the overall policy environment.”17
International organizations and international financial institutions also
played a key role in providing a platform to identify the problem corruption
posed to the effective use of development aid. For example, at its 1992 High Level
Meeting, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (“DAC”)—made
up of the representatives of the major foreign aid donor countries—addressed
what OECD Development Co-operation Directorate Director Helmut
Führer18 called “one of the last taboo subjects,”19 namely corruption. The DAC
highlighted the detrimental impacts of corruption on development, observing
that “corruption can result in the misuse of aid as well as domestic resources
and can damage the reputation of aid efforts in donor countries.”20 In 1996,
the DAC formally recommended that Members introduce anti-corruption
provisions for procurement that is funded by bilateral aid, in keeping with the

15. Carolyn Hotchkiss, “The Sleeping Dog Stirs: New Signs of Life in Efforts to End Corruption
in International Business” (1998) 17:1 J Pub Pol’y & Marketing 108 at 112.
16. Overseas Development Institute, “Aid and Political Reform,” Briefing Paper (January
1992) at 2, online: <www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinionfiles/6774.pdf>.
17. Ibid.
18. Führer was the Director of the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate
from 1975 to 1993.
19. The Story of Official Development Assistance: A History of the Development Assistance
Committee and the Development Co-operation Directorate in Dates, Names and Figures
(Paris: OECD, 1994) at 60.
20. Ibid at 61.
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rationale that corruption wastes the scarce resources available for development.21
The DAC Recommendation was one of the precursors to the 1997 OECD
Revised Recommendation22 and the subsequent OECD Convention.23
The anti-corruption campaigners of the 1990s felt that there was little
prospect of disciplining governments for condoning corruption by their own
officials. However, they believed that corruption could be curbed by imposing
harsh penalties on the bribe payers (hence the term “supply side”). This belief was
the motivation behind the OECD’s anti-corruption work in the 1990s.
ii.

ANTI-CORRUPTION AND THE US BUSINESS COMMUNITY

By the early 1990s, the US business community had become an important
proponent of international anti-corruption efforts. Since 1977, US-domiciled
companies had been subject to domestic federal anti-corruption legislation in
the form of the FCPA. While competitors from other countries were free to bribe
with impunity, US companies had the burden of complying with the FCPA,
which prohibited making payments to foreign government officials in order to
obtain or retain business.
Soon after the United States enacted the FCPA, the American business
community argued that the Act disadvantaged American companies relative to
foreign competitors.24 Within the first few years of the FCPA’s operation, the US
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) conducted a survey of a sample of the
largest US firms and found that over 60 per cent of respondents felt that, all other
conditions being equal, American companies could not compete internationally

21. OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Recommendation on Anti-Corruption
Proposals for Aid-Funded Procurement: Follow-up report, (May 1997), online: <www.
oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/recommendationonanti-corruptionproposalsforaidfundedprocurementfollow-upreport.htm>.
22. OECD, Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business
Transactions, 36 ILM 1016 (23 May 1997) [1997 Revised Recommendation].
23. Supra note 1.
24. See e.g. US, Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy and Subcommittee
on Securities on the Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on US Business, 97th Cong
(Washington: United States General Accounting Office, 1981) (Donald L Scantlebury)
[Scantlebury Statement]. Donald L Scantlebury was the Chief Accountant of the General
Accounting Office and Division Director of the Accounting and Financial Management
Division. See also US, Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Finance and
Monetary Policy and the Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong (Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1983) at 68, 78.
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against foreign competitors able to pay bribes.25 Over 50 per cent of respondents
believed that an international anti-bribery treaty would strengthen the United
States’s competitive position.26 The GAO accordingly argued that Congress
should urge the President to actively pursue an international agreement.27
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the US business community and a variety
of US government actors advocated for an international treaty to address the
problem of corruption and ameliorate the disadvantages created by the FCPA.
Industry organizations such as the US Chamber of Commerce strongly supported
FCPA reform efforts to mitigate the unintended detrimental impacts of the FCPA
on business. Proposed bills, such as the 1983 Business Accounting and Foreign Trade
Simplification Act, not only included clarifications of US domestic legislation
but also called on the President to pursue negotiations towards an international
agreement on illicit payments and to report any progress to Congress.28 However,
it was not until the Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 that
the FCPA was successfully amended.29 Among other things, the 1988 Act required
the President to negotiate an agreement with the OECD to internationalize the
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.30
The concern that the FCPA disadvantaged the United States against its
economic competitors appears to explain why decision makers chose to act
specifically at the OECD. An international agreement among this organization’s
members—most of the world’s largest economies, accounting for the
overwhelming majority of exports and foreign direct investment—would bind
the US business community’s major competitors, thereby levelling the economic
playing field for American companies.31

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Scantlebury Statement, supra note 24 at 14.
Ibid.
Ibid at 15.
US, Bill S 414, 98th Cong, 1983.
Pub L 100-418, 102 Stat 1107.
Ellen Gutterman, “Easier Done than Said: Transnational Bribery, Norm Resonance,
and the Origins of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (2015) 11:1 Foreign Pol’y
Analysis 109 at 117.
31. See William J Clinton, “Statement by the President” (10 November 1998), online: The
United States Department of Justice <www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/
legacy/2012/11/14/signing.pdf> (statement delivered at the signing of the International
Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998 at The White House). See also The United
States Department of Justice, “Proposed Legislative History: International Anti-Bribery Act
of 1998” (14 November 2012), online: <www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/
legacy/2012/11/14/leghistory.pdf>.
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iii.

ANTI-CORRUPTION AT THE OECD

Following these developments at home, US officials at the OECD began in 1989 to
advocate for other OECD Members to criminalize the bribery of foreign officials
in commercial transactions.32 This is not to say that bribery was previously absent
from the policy work of the OECD; for example, the 1976 OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises33 included a specific anti-bribery provision.34 However,
guidelines for the conduct of multinational enterprises could hardly satisfy the
wishes of the US business community that OECD Member countries introduce
FCPA-like legislation domestically to criminalize the offer or payment of bribes
to foreign officials.
As with previous efforts to develop an international agreement on illicit
payments, the United States’s efforts were met with opposition. Prominent
OECD Members, such as Germany, France, Japan, and Spain, initially opposed
the initiative.35 Specifically, France and Germany objected to the extraterritorial
effect of the proposed bribery offence. Germany also raised concerns regarding
the difficulty of detecting and proving the existence of bribery.36 However, by
1994, their opposition abated, and the OECD adopted a formal anti-corruption
Recommendation.37 In addition to calling on member states to take effective
measures to deter, prevent, and combat the bribery of foreign public officials,
the 1994 Recommendation required the Committee on International Investment
32. Mark Pieth, “International Cooperation to Combat Corruption” in Kimberly Ann Elliott,
ed, Corruption and the Global Economy (Washington: Institute for International Economics,
1997) 119 at 122-23 [Pieth, “International Cooperation to Combat Corruption”]. See
also US, House Commerce Committee, 105th Cong, International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1998) at 10.
33. OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, National Treatment, International Investment
Incentives and Disincentives, Consultation Procedures (Paris: OECD, 1976), online: <www.
oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/50024800.pdf>. The Guidelines were annexed to the 1976 Declaration
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. See OECD, Declaration on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 15 ILM 967 (21 June 1976).
34. Ibid at 972. In particular, it states, “Enterprises should … not render – and they should not
be solicited or expected to render – any bribe or other improper benefit, direct or indirect, to
any public servant or holder of public office” (ibid).
35. Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A Lacey & Jutta Birmele, “The 1998 OECD
Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes toward Corruption in
Business Transactions” (2000) 37:3 Am Bus LJ 485 at 496.
36. Ibid.
37. OECD, Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Bribery in International Business
Transactions, 33 ILM 1389 (27 May 1994) [1994 Recommendation]. See also Pieth,
“International Cooperation to Combat Corruption,” supra note 32 at 122-23.
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and Multinational Enterprises (“CIME”) to review it and its implementation
within three years.38
As part of the review process, the OECD consulted with business and NGOs
to obtain their input regarding the implementation of the 1994 Recommendation.39
When developing and negotiating the draft OECD Convention text, OECD
delegations also consulted with members of the business community that had
played such a significant role in putting anti-corruption on the international
agenda. For example, the OECD’s standing advisory body, the Business and
Industry Advisory Committee (“BIAC”), consulted closely with the OECD
delegations during the negotiation of the OECD Convention.40 The OECD has
officially recognized BIAC since its founding in 1962 as the voice of the business
community in OECD Member states. This is not to say, however, that members
of BIAC were always unequivocal on all anti-corruption issues. For example,
members of BIAC were divided with respect to the appropriate scope of the
OECD Convention including with respect to, among other things, whether it
should apply to state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) (through the definition of a
“foreign country”), or contributions to candidates for political office and political
parties (through the definition of a “public official”).
Other international business organizations were also consulted by the
OECD, such as the ICC, a business association whose mandate includes the
promotion of an open international trade and investment system. Notably, the
ICC was an early proponent of an international anti-corruption treaty. Its efforts
began in 1975, when it established a committee chaired by Lord Shawcross.41
The 1977 Shawcross Report recommended that the United Nations (“UN”)
draw up an international anti-bribery treaty and called for businesses to impose

38. 1994 Recommendation, supra note 37, art IX.
39. OECD, OECD Actions to Fight Corruption (Note by the Secretary-General) (Paris:
OECD, 1997) at 2.
40. Letter from M Pieth to HK van Egmond (29 September 1997) [on file with authors]. See
also OECD, Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD
Actions to Fight Corruption: Review of the 1994 Recommendation on Bribery in International
Business Transactions, Including Proposals to Facilitate the Criminalisation of Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials (Paris: OECD, 1997) at 10 [OECD, Review of the 1994 Recommendation].
41. Hartley William Shawcross was a former Attorney General of Great Britain and prosecutor at
the Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg,
held between 20 November 1945 and 1 October 1946. See Encyclopaedia Britannica,
“Hartley William Shawcross, Baron Shawcross of Friston” (31 December 2003), online:
<www.britannica.com/biography/Hartley-William-Shawcross-Baron-Shawcross-of-Friston>.

BARUTCISKI, BANDALI, CORRUPTION AT THE INTERSECTION OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 241

some form of self-regulation.42 However, the proposed UN convention failed to
gather enough support, and in the 1990s, the ICC shifted its attention to the
OECD, perceiving it as a more effective forum within which such a treaty could
be negotiated.43
B. THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
1.

DEVELOPING A BINDING CONVENTION

Although CIME was originally expected to report to the Council in May 1997,44
before the Council Meeting convened, France and Germany argued that the only
way to ensure fairness among all Members was to negotiate a binding convention.
Moreover, they asserted that a convention was required because each country’s
legal system was different.45 Both the United States and TI opposed this position
reportedly because they feared that negotiating a binding convention would take
years and therefore delay international action.46
The parties reached a compromise by combining the convention proposal
with a collective pledge to legislate within a specified time period.47 The 1997
Revised Recommendation therefore engaged two parallel strategies: (1) It called
on Members to adopt national laws criminalizing the bribery of foreign
public officials by the end of 1998 and (2) it committed the Council to open
negotiations immediately to conclude an international convention to criminalize
bribery by the end of 1997 in order for the convention to enter into force by
the end of 1998.48

42. International Chamber of Commerce, Commission on Ethical Practices, Recommendations
to Combat Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, 17 ILM 417 (29
November 1977) at 418.
43. Fritz Heimann & Mathias Hirsch, “How International Business Combats Extortion and
Bribery: Anti-corruption Efforts by the International Chamber of Commerce,” in OECD,
No Longer Business as Usual: Fighting Bribery and Corruption (Paris: OECD, 2000) at 170-71.
44. Pieth, “International Cooperation to Combat Corruption,” supra note 32 at 125.
45. Paul Blustein, “Fight Looms Over Foreign Bribery,” The Washington Post (9
May 1997), online: <www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/05/09/
fight-looms-over-foreign-bribery/3ea22baa-631c-4263-8695-9aec56c6c3b8>.
46. Paul Blustein, “Pact to Bar Bribery is Reached,” The Washington Post (24 May 1997), online:
<www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1997/05/24/pact-to-bar-bribery-is-reached/
b1817181-a12b-4183-b508-0ea40d19c2a1>.
47. Ibid.
48. 1997 Revised Recommendation, supra note 22, art III.
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2.

FOCUS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF BRIBERY TRANSACTIONS

One of the reasons that the OECD Convention is such a significant instrument in
the fight against corruption is because of its focus on the supply side of international
bribery. By making the potential cost of engaging in bribery greater than its
benefits, the OECD Convention targets private companies in capital-exporting
OECD countries, seeking to cut off the flow of international bribery at its source.
As a result of the OECD Convention, all thirty-four OECD Member states and
six additional signatories now prohibit bribery of foreign officials.
The OECD Convention binds the home countries of the vast majority
of international businesses, making it an important consideration for many
multinational corporations. The fact remains that even today—despite the
emergence of global corporations from China, Russia, Brazil, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and many other countries—the overwhelming majority of multinational
corporations are domiciled in OECD countries and therefore are subject to the
foreign corruption laws introduced as a result of the OECD Convention.
3.

CONTENT AND SCOPE OF THE OECD CONVENTION

The OECD Convention is short and focused, with one central obligation: Article 1
requires State parties to introduce strict measures to criminalize the bribery of
foreign officials.49 The OECD Convention also addresses ancillary matters such as
jurisdiction,50 penalties,51 enforcement cooperation,52 and peer review.53
Despite its reach, the OECD Convention does not have the broader scope
and coverage of later conventions, such as the UNCAC. Most notably, it does
not address so-called passive bribery and the systemic or institutional challenges
faced by countries where public officials solicit bribes54 (of course, the distinction
between “active” and “passive” bribery is somewhat misleading since bribe
recipients are rarely passive and play an active role in soliciting or extorting bribes
and incentivizing corrupt practices).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Supra note 1, art 1.
Ibid, art 4.
Ibid, art 3.
Ibid, arts 5, 9, 10.
Ibid, art 12.
OECD, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (Paris: OECD, 1997) at 14, online: <www.oecd.org/daf/
anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf>.
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4.

IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE, AND PEER REVIEW

To implement their obligations under the OECD Convention, states must make
legislative changes (for example, by introducing the offence of bribing a foreign
public official into domestic criminal law) and follow those changes up through
law enforcement activity. On both fronts, the record of compliance with the
OECD Convention by Member states is mixed; however, it is steadily improving,
in part as a result of the OECD Convention’s peer-review process. The peer-review
process consists of three phases. In the first phase, peer country reviewers consider
the target country’s legislation. In the second phase, the reviewers examine
whether the legislation that exists is effectively applied. In the third phase, the
reviewers focus on enforcement efforts and any outstanding recommendations.
Discussions about the scope and focus of a fourth phase of review took place
recently,55 and this further stage of review may commence in late 2015.
The intention of a peer-review process is to encourage countries to “name and
shame” each other, raising the bar of what constitutes adequate implementation.
Peer-review processes and the scrutiny of anti-corruption NGOs, which use
independent metrics to monitor performance, shine a spotlight on the progress
or lack thereof by countries in the fight against bribery. The result has been the
increasingly vigorous implementation and enforcement of foreign bribery laws
not only by the United States but also by Germany, Korea, Italy, Japan, France,
Norway, Switzerland, the UK, Belgium, and Canada.
For example, after the OECD Working Group expressed concern about the
United Kingdom’s existing legislative framework,56 the United Kingdom stated
its intention to reform its laws57 and ultimately introduced the Bribery Act,58 one
of the most comprehensive anti-bribery laws in the world. Similarly in Canada,

55. OECD, “Public Consultation on Phase 4 monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention” (2015), online: <www.oecd.org/corruption/2014-call-for-comment-phase-4anti-bribery-convention.htm>. The public consultation was launched on 5 November 2014
and ended on 1 December 2014 (ibid).
56. OECD, United Kingdom: Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997
Recommendation (Paris: OECD, 1999) at 24-25, online: <www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
anti-briberyconvention/2754266.pdf>.
57. OECD, United Kingdom: Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997
Recommendation: Phase I Bis Report (Paris: OECD, 2003) at 1, 16-17, online: <www.oecd.
org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/2498215.pdf>.
58. Bribery Act 2010 (UK), c 23.
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criticism of the government’s lax enforcement59 prompted both the continued
acceleration of enforcement efforts and legislative amendments to implement the
Working Group’s key recommendations.60 Because of the supply-side focus of the
OECD Convention obligations, companies and individuals who offered or paid
bribes are the focus of enforcement efforts by OECD Member states. Since the
OECD Convention entered into force, 427 foreign bribery enforcement actions
have been undertaken globally.61 Although the peak of enforcement occurred in
2011, when seventy-eight cases were concluded, the OECD Foreign Bribery Report
also discloses that foreign bribery cases are taking longer to prosecute (increasing
in length from an average of two years between the accused’s last criminal
act and the sanction in 1999 to an average of 7.3 years in 2013). The OECD
Foreign Bribery Report speculates that a number of factors may be responsible
for this trend, including the complexity of investigations and the willingness of
individuals or entities accused to resist or to settle the charges against them.62

59. See OECD, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Canada
(Paris: OECD, 2011) at 6, 59-60, online: <www.oecd.org/canada/Canadaphase3reportEN.
pdf> [OECD, Phase 3 Report]; OECD, News Release, “Canada’s enforcement of the foreign
bribery offence still lagging; must urgently boost efforts to prosecute” (28 March 2011),
online: <www.oecd.org/newsroom/canadasenforcementoftheforeignbriberyoffencestill
laggingmusturgentlyboosteffortstoprosecute.htm>.
60. Global Affairs Canada, News Release, “Strengthening Canada’s Fight Against
Foreign Bribery” (5 February 2013), online: <www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/
news-communiques/2013/02/05b.aspx?lang=eng> [Global Affairs Canada, “Strengthening
Canada’s Fight”].
61. OECD, OECD Foreign Bribery Report: An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials (Paris: OECD, 2014) at 11, online: <www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/
download/2814011e.pdf?expires=1459014725&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=DD9
E181BC5E9D17A8D1221A46FDFEDEB> [OECD, OECD Foreign Bribery Report]. The
OECD Foreign Bribery Report analyzes case information from all countries that have enacted
the offence of bribery of foreign public officials in their domestic criminal law.
62. Ibid at 13-14.

BARUTCISKI, BANDALI, CORRUPTION AT THE INTERSECTION OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 245

In Canada, as discussed in greater detail in Part III, below, corporate fines
of 9.5 million Canadian dollars (“CAD”)63 and 10.35 million CAD64 have been
imposed in two cases since 2011. In 2013, the first individual was tried and
convicted of conspiring to offer a bribe65 and was sentenced to three years of
imprisonment.66 In total, monetary sanctions totalling 5.4 billion US dollars
(“USD”) have been imposed in countries with a foreign bribery offence.67 These
fines, together with the reputational damage of being convicted of criminal
bribery, have resulted in a significant shift in corporate attitudes. Of the cases
analyzed in the OECD Foreign Bribery Report, 31 per cent were brought to the
attention of law enforcement authorities through corporations’ self-reporting.68
Moreover, many multinational corporations have adopted strict anti-corruption
compliance policies and other internal controls at substantial expense. Of the 137
cases brought to law enforcement through self-reporting, companies detected the
bribery through internal audits in 31 per cent of cases or due diligence in mergers
and acquisitions (“M&A”) transactions in 28 per cent of cases.69 Given that both
internal audits and M&A due diligence can be complex and resource-intensive,
these statistics indicate that companies are willing to devote time and resources
to detecting and avoiding anti-corruption liability. The OECD Convention’s focus
on the supply side of bribery transactions aims to incentivize this kind of change.

63. See R v Niko Resources Ltd (2011), 101 WCB (2d) 118, [2012] AWLD 4536 (QB) [Niko].
Niko Resources pled guilty for bribing a foreign public official in Bangladesh (ibid at para
1). Through its subsidiary, Niko Bangladesh, the company provided the use of a vehicle and
paid travel and accommodation expenses for the then State Minister for Energy and Mineral
Resources to attend an oil and gas industry exhibition in Calgary (see points 4-5 in ibid at
para 21). The use of the vehicle was valued at approximately 191,000 CAD and the trip
cost 5,000 CAD (ibid). Niko was fined 9.5 million CAD (including a 15 per cent victim
surcharge) (ibid at para 21).
64. See R v Griffiths Energy International, [2013] AJ No 412 (QL) at para 10 (QB) [Griffiths].
Griffiths Energy entered a guilty plea on one count of bribery contrary to the CFPOA and
was fined 9 million dollars plus a 15 per cent victim surcharge for a total penalty of $10.35
million (ibid at para 10). Griffiths Energy admitted to having paid a 2 million dollar success
fee to a company controlled by the wife of the ambassador to Canada of the Republic
of Chad in connection with securing an oil and gas concession in the African country
(ibid at para 7).
65. R v Karigar, 2013 ONSC 5199 at para 42, 108 WCB (2d) 210 [Karigar, Trial Decision].
66. R v Karigar, 2014 ONSC 3093 at para 37, 113 WCB (2d) 373 [Karigar,
Sentencing Decision].
67. OECD, OECD Foreign Bribery Report, supra note 61 at 18.
68. Ibid at 15-16.
69. Ibid at 16-17.
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II. CANADA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
C. THE CFPOA

While all OECD Member countries have adopted laws to implement the OECD
Convention, several have yet to enforce those laws in a serious way. For several
years after its ratification of the OECD Convention, Canada was a case in point.
In 1998, Canada passed the CFPOA, thus implementing its obligation under the
OECD Convention to create a foreign bribery offence at domestic law. However,
Canada did not commit any resources to the enforcement of the CFPOA at the
time of its enactment nor did it identify any particular agency as having primary
responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of CFPOA offences.
The CFPOA is a criminal statute that prohibits the offering, promising,
or giving of anything of value to a foreign public official, whether directly or
indirectly, in exchange for using the foreign public official’s position or influence
to obtain a business advantage. In the original CFPOA, “business” was specified
to be “any business, profession, trade, calling, manufacture or undertaking of any
kind carried on in Canada or elsewhere for profit.”70 When the legislation entered
into force in February 1999, the offence was punishable by up to five years of
imprisonment or a fine in the court’s discretion.71
Originally, Canada’s jurisdiction over foreign bribery offences was territorial
in scope: In order for Canada to have jurisdiction over an alleged offence, a
court had to find that the offence had a “real and substantial link” with Canada,
pursuant to the test for jurisdiction under Canadian common law (established
in Libman).72 In R v Karigar, the only existing jurisprudence on the application
of territorial jurisdiction to the bribery of a foreign public official, the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice concluded that Canada could assert territorial
jurisdiction over a bribery offence where few elements of the offence occurred
in Canada. In rejecting the defendant’s argument that the court lacked territorial

70. CFPOA, supra note 5, s 2 [emphasis added]. The definition of “business” was later amended,
removing “for profit.” See Fighting Foreign Corruption Act, SC 2013, c 26, s 2(3), amending
CFPOA, supra note 5, s 2.
71. Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, “Corruption of Foreign Public Officials:
Guideline of the Director Issued Under Section 3(3)(c) of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Act” in Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook (Ottawa: PPSC, 2014) at 2, online:
<www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/d-g-eng.pdf> [PPSC, “Corruption of
Foreign Public Officials”].
72. Libman, supra note 14 at 213.
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jurisdiction73 because Libman requires “the bulk of the elements of the offence”74
to have occurred in Canada, Justice Hackland held that “[t]he substantial
connection test is not limited to the essential elements of the offence as submitted
by the accused.”75 Moreover, Justice Hackland noted that in the specific context
of a bribery offence, “one cannot segregate or otherwise deal with the bribery
as a separate and discrete issue thereby excluding the legitimate aspects of the
transaction from consideration in applying the substantial connection test.”76
1.

ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENCE

To obtain a conviction under the CFPOA for the offence of bribing a foreign
public official, the prosecution must prove both the actus reus (the prohibited act)
and mens rea (a guilty mind). With respect to the proof of mens rea in this context,
there is no requirement to prove a specific corrupt intent. It is sufficient for the
prosecution to prove that the accused, having reason to know or suspect that a
third party might make or offer a bribe on its behalf, failed to make appropriate
further inquiries or to take remedial action (i.e., the doctrine of willful blindness).
The prosecution must also establish the following elements of the actus reus:
Every person …, in order to obtain or retain an advantage in the course of business,
directly or indirectly gives, offers or agrees to give or offer a loan, reward, advantage
or benefit of any kind to a foreign public official or to any person for the benefit of
a foreign public official
(a) as consideration for an act or omission by the official in connection with the …
official’s duties or functions; or
(b) to induce the official to use his or her position to influence any acts or decisions
of the [government] … for which the official performs duties or functions.77

As noted above, when first introduced, the actus reus of the offence as defined
in the CFPOA required that the bribe be offered or paid to obtain an advantage
in the course of business “for profit.”78
The offence contemplates an exchange, or quid pro quo, between the person
making the bribe and the official such that the benefit is given or offered to
73. A pretrial motion ruling directed that this argument would be dealt with as a substantive
defence and heard at the close of the Crown’s case. See R v Karigar, 2012 ONSC 2730 at
para 11, [2012] OJ No 6531 (QL).
74. Karigar, Trial Decision, supra note 65 at para 37.
75. Ibid at para 39.
76. Ibid at para 39.
77. CFPOA, supra note 5, s 3(1).
78. Ibid, s 2. See also Fighting Foreign Corruption Act, supra note 70, s 2(3).
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the official in order to induce the official to use his or her official position to
the business advantage of the person making the bribe. In Karigar, the court
concluded that the use of the verb “agree” in the phrase “agrees to give or offer”
imports the concept of conspiracy into the CFPOA, such that an agreement
by persons to give or offer a bribe to a foreign public official is a violation of
the CFPOA whether or not there is proof that the public official was offered
or received the bribe.79 In the Karigar decision, Justice Hackland specifically
observed that interpreting the legislation this way meets Canada’s obligations
under the OECD Convention.80
2.

FACILITATION PAYMENTS

The Canadian legislation also included an exception for “facilitation payments.”
The exception exempts a payment “made to expedite or secure the performance
by a foreign public official of any act of a routine nature that is part of the foreign
public official’s duties or functions” by deeming that such payment does not
amount to a “loan, reward, advantage or benefit” paid to obtain “an advantage in
the course of business” such as to trigger the commission of the bribery offence.81
Although the CFPOA does not define “acts of a routine nature,” it includes an
illustrative list of examples:
(a) the issuance of a permit, licence or other document to qualify a person to do
business; (b) the processing of official documents, such as visas and work permits;
(c) the provision of services normally offered to the public, such as mail pick-up
and delivery, telecommunication services and power and water supply; and (d) the
provision of services normally provided as required, such as police protection, loading
and unloading of cargo, the protection of perishable products or commodities from
deterioration or the scheduling of inspections related to contract performance or
transit of goods.82

The CFPOA further specifies that a decision to award new business, to
continue existing business, or to encourage another person to make such a
decision are not considered acts of a routine nature and therefore cannot fall
under the exception for facilitation payments.83

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Karigar, Trial Decision, supra note 65 at para 28.
Ibid.
CFPOA, supra note 5, s 3(4).
Ibid, ss 3(4)(a)-(d).
Ibid, s 3(5).
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D. JUNE 2013 AMENDMENTS TO THE CFPOA

Although the enactment of the CFPOA was a welcome milestone in Canada’s
implementation of its obligations under the OECD Convention, the legislation
was subject to criticism, both through the peer-review process and in other fora.
The OECD’s 2004 Phase 2 Report on Canada’s implementation of its obligations
under the OECD Convention identified a number of perceived legislative
deficiencies, including the continued exception for facilitation payments, the
“for profit” requirement in the definition of “business,” and most importantly,
the lack of nationality-based jurisdiction.84 In 2009, the government had
introduced Bill C-31,85 which, if passed, would have amended the CFPOA to
permit nationality-based jurisdiction. However, the bill died in the committee
stage when Parliament was prorogued in December 2009.
In the winter of 2011–2012, the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (“DFAIT”), as it was then called, undertook a broad
consultation regarding the CFPOA. The consultation involved corporate, legal,
and NGO representatives from various sectors, and it resulted in the introduction
of significant amendments to the CFPOA in 2013 relating to: (1) nationality
jurisdiction, (2) clarification of the definition of “business” for the purposes
of bribery, (3) elimination of facilitation payments, and (4) the establishment
of a books and records offence. The amendments also increased the maximum
penalty on a guilty plea or conviction for individuals (from five to fourteen years
of imprisonment) and conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (“RCMP”) for investigation and charges under the CFPOA (the
latter change is discussed in greater detail in Part III, below).
3.

NATIONALITY-BASED JURISDICTION

Canada’s lack of nationality jurisdiction for foreign bribery offences was a
significant area of concern with respect to its implementation of the OECD
Convention. In its Phase 2 Follow-Up Report in 2006, the Working Group noted
that “Canada is the only Party to the Convention which has still not established
84. OECD, Canada: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on
Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions (Paris: OECD, 2004) at 39, online:
<www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/31643002.pdf>.
85. Bill C-31, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act
and the Identification of Criminals Act and to make a consequential amendment to another
Act, 2nd Sess, 40th Parl, 2009 (referred to Committee in the House of Commons on 27
November 2009).
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nationality jurisdiction for the foreign bribery offence.”86 Canada’s response was
that the OECD Convention did not mandate the creation of nationality-based
jurisdiction; Article 4 of the OECD Convention simply requires that Parties
review whether their current basis for jurisdiction is effective to fight foreign
bribery.87 Canada took the position that the “real and substantial connection”
test established in Libman has permitted Canada to extend its territorial criminal
jurisdiction where circumstances warrant, and that in the one foreign bribery
case concluded at the time, jurisdiction was not an issue.88 However, Canada
also stated that it was monitoring this aspect of its implementation, and that “if
there was evidence that nationality jurisdiction is necessary to implement the
Convention effectively,” Canada would reconsider its implementation.89
In its Phase 2 Follow-Up Report, the Working Group noted that its concern
was based on the “much narrower” scope for territorial jurisdiction in Canada
due to the requirement that there be “substantial” links between the elements of
the offence and Canada.90 Furthermore, the Working Group noted that Article
4.2 of the OECD Convention requires countries that have established nationality
jurisdiction over other offences to apply it to the offence of foreign bribery, and
that as Canada has nationality jurisdiction over several other offences, it should
expand the scope of its jurisdiction in this context as well.91
Accordingly, the 2013 amendments established nationality-based jurisdiction
for foreign bribery offences. Pursuant to the new section 5(1), Canada may
take jurisdiction over offences committed outside of Canada where the person
committing the offence was a Canadian citizen, permanent resident, or was
incorporated (or otherwise formed or organized) in Canada.
4.

DEFINITION OF BUSINESS

By deleting the words “for profit” from the definition of “business,” the CFPOA
as amended prohibits the paying of a bribe to obtain an advantage in business,
whether that business is for-profit or not-for-profit. Importantly, this expands
86. OECD, Canada: Phase 2 Follow-Up Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2
Recommendations on the Application of the Convention and the 1997 Recommendation
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (Paris: OECD, 2006) at 5, online: <www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
anti-briberyconvention/36984779.pdf> [OECD, Phase 2 Follow-Up Report].
87. Ibid at 21.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid at 5.
91. Ibid.
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the scope of the CFPOA to apply to the conduct of Canadian NGOs or other
non-commercial entities.
Canada had originally resisted eliminating the “for profit” requirement; in
its response to the OECD Working Group on Bribery, Canada indicated that
it thought the CFPOA’s application to for-profit activity was in keeping with
reference to “Business Transactions” or “transactions commerciales” in the title of
the OECD Convention.92 The Working Group disagreed, noting that the OECD
Convention does not create a distinction between transactions that are for-profit
and not-for-profit.93
5.

ELIMINATION OF FACILITATION PAYMENTS EXCEPTION

The treatment of facilitation payments was an issue for several Parties to the
OECD Convention. Nonetheless, in its Phase 3 Report the OECD Working
Group concluded that Canada was failing to implement the (post-OECD
Convention) recommendation94 that Member countries periodically review their
policies on and approach to facilitation payments.95 The 2009 Recommendation
further recommended that Member countries “encourage companies to prohibit
or discourage the use of small facilitation payments in internal company controls,
ethics and compliance programmes or measures … .”96
The June 2013 amendments eliminate the CFPOA’s exception for facilitation
payments. Canada’s response to the Phase 3 Report indicates that this amendment
is a result of Canada’s completion of a review of its policies on and approaches to
the issue of small facilitation payments.97 However, this change will only come
into force at a future date to be determined by the federal Cabinet, in order to
give Canadian companies and individuals time to bring their internal controls
and practices into compliance with the “zero tolerance” approach of the revised
CFPOA.98 At time of writing, no date for the entry into force of this amendment
has been announced.
92. Ibid at 20.
93. Ibid at 4.
94. OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transaction (Paris: OECD, 2009), online: <www.oecd.org/
daf/anti-bribery/44176910.pdf> [OECD, 2009 Recommendation].
95. OECD, Phase 3 Report, supra note 59 at 16.
96. OECD, 2009 Recommendation, supra note 94, art VI(ii).
97. OECD, Canada: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations (Paris: OECD, 2013)
at 12-13, online: <www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/CanadaP3writtenfollowupreportEN.pdf>
[OECD, Follow-Up to Phase 3].
98. Ibid.
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6.

BOOKS AND RECORDS OFFENCE

The 2013 amendments created a new and separate “books and records” offence,
which criminalizes the creation or maintenance of secret, incomplete, or inaccurate
books and records for the purpose of engaging in or hiding the bribery of foreign
public officials. Under section 4 of the CFPOA, it is now an offence to keep
secret accounts, falsely record, not record, or inadequately identify transactions,
enter liabilities with incorrect identification of their object, use false documents,
or destroy accounting books and records earlier than permitted by law, for the
purpose of concealing bribery of a public official.99 As a result, CFPOA liability
can now flow from conduct relating to the financial records of a corporation
made after an alleged corruption offence.
The introduction of this offence was intended to implement Article 8 of
the OECD Convention, which requires that each State Party “provide effective,
proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal penalties” for
omissions and falsifications of “the books, records, accounts and financial
statements of such companies” that are done “for the purpose of bribing foreign
public officials or of hiding such bribery.”100 Although Canada maintained its
position that the Criminal Code contains several provisions that are relevant
to the Article 8 obligation, it reported that the amendments to the CFPOA
supplemented the Criminal Code provisions and provided law enforcement with
additional tools.101
The new books and records offence is potentially the most important recent
Canadian development in promoting compliance. For the first time, senior
corporate officials can incur liability under the CFPOA for their conduct after
a corrupt incident if they participate in or turn a blind eye to a cover-up of
past misconduct.
E.

DEBARMENT AND NON-CRIMINAL LAW MECHANISM

Canada also uses alternative administrative measures to promote compliance with
anti-corruption laws through its provision of services to Canadian companies
operating abroad and through public procurement policies. Since 2004, Export
Development Canada (“EDC”) has had a policy of debarring companies from
EDC support until the EDC considers that the company has taken appropriate

99. CFPOA, supra note 5, s 4.
100. OECD Convention, supra note 1, art 8.
101. OECD, Follow-Up to Phase 3, supra note 97 at 10.
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measures to deter further bribery.102 Since late 2012, the department of Public
Works and Government Services (“PWGSC”) (which administers procurement
for the federal government) automatically disqualifies companies convicted of an
offence under the CFPOA from federal government contracts.103 In the spring
of 2014, the PWGSC extended this policy to companies convicted of bribery
offences in foreign jurisdictions and under foreign laws.104 In 2015, the
federal government introduced a new government-wide integrity regime for
its procurement and real property transactions which responded to many of
these criticisms.105
After these developments, Canada’s debarment regime came under some
criticism for its broad scope, perceived inflexibility, and absence of sufficient
due process mechanisms, among other things.106 In its 2015 Budget, the federal
government committed to introducing a new government-wide integrity regime
for its procurement and real property transactions, and this further stage of
review is scheduled to commence in 2016.107

102. Export Development Canada, “EDC’s Anti-Corruption Policy Guidelines,” online: <www.
edc.ca/EN/About-Us/Corporate-Social-Responsibility/Documents/anti-corruptionguidelines.pdf>.
103. Global Affairs Canada, Fourteenth Annual Report to Parliament: Implementation of the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, and the Enforcement of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act
(7 November 2013), online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/corr-14.aspx?lang=eng> [Global Affairs Canada,
Fourteenth Annual Report]. See also Public Works and Government Services Canada,
“Ineligibility and Suspension Policy” (3 July 2015), online: <www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/
politique-policy-eng.html>.
104. Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Backgrounder on the new
government-wide integrity regime” (3 July 2015), online: <www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/
synopsis-backgrounder-eng.html>.
105. James Munson, “Ottawa makes anti-corruption waivers a condition of Trade Commissioner
Service,” iPolitics.ca (9 December 2014), online: <newcanadianmedia.ca/item/21941>.
106. Barrie McKenna, “Ottawa working to modify strict anti-corruption rules,” The Globe
and Mail (27 January 2015), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/
ottawa-working-to-modify-strict-anti-corruption-rules/article22661799>.
107. Government of Canada, “Chapter 5.1 – Balancing the Budget and Reducing the Debt
Burden” (21 April 2015), online: <www.budget.gc.ca/2015/docs/plan/ch5-1-eng.
html#Improving_the_Integrity_of_Federal_Procurement>.
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III. CANADA’S ENFORCEMENT RECORD TO DATE
As noted above, despite the entry into force of the CFPOA in February 1999,108
there was no dedicated enforcement agency for most of the first decade of the
CFPOA’s existence.109 The CFPOA was originally drafted so that every police officer
in the country (federal, provincial, or municipal) was empowered to investigate
and lay charges pursuant to its provisions. Further, an entry-level prosecutor
(federal or provincial) could prosecute the charges it created. This approach was
fundamentally ineffective. By putting everyone in charge, it effectively left no
one in charge. The result was that there was little real enforcement of Canada’s
international corruption law for the first decade of the CFPOA’s existence and
scant attention was paid to the CFPOA by Canadian companies. Canada’s lack of
enforcement contrasted starkly with US FCPA enforcement through the 1990s
and the dramatic upswing in convictions in the 2000s,110 culminating in the
record fine paid by Siemens in 2008 (eight hundred million USD).111
The situation changed in Canada in late 2007 and 2008. Following repeated
criticism in the OECD peer-review process and TI’s annual reviews, as well as
Canada’s ratification of the UNCAC in October 2007, the Canadian government
established a dedicated International Anti-Corruption Team (“IACT”) within
the RCMP’s Commercial Crime Branch.112 The IACT consisted of two
seven-person teams based in Ottawa (the nation’s capital and the location of
the centre of Canadian federal government as well as foreign embassies) and
108. CFPOA, supra note 5, s 13.
109. In 2008, the RCMP established the International Anti-Corruption Unit, which was
dedicated to the enforcement of the CFPOA. See Global Affairs Canada, “Strengthening
Canada’s Fight,” supra note 60.
110. Shearman & Sterling LLP, “Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement” (March
2006) at 2, online: <www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2006/03/
Recent-Trends-and-Patterns-in-FCPA-Enforcement/Files/View-Full-Text/FileAttachment/
LIT_032706.pdf>.
111. US Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release, 2008-294, “SEC Charges Siemens
AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery” (15 December 2008), online: <www.sec.gov/news/
press/2008/2008-294.htm>. The 800 million USD refers to fines paid to US authorities only
(ibid). Siemens also paid 854 million USD to German authorities (ibid). See also Jeffrey J
Meagher & Matthew J Fader, “Siemens Pays Record $800 Million to Settle Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Charges” (23 December 2008), online: <www.klgates.com/siemens-pays-record800-million-to-settle-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-charges-12-23-2008>.
112. Fritz Heimann & Gillian Dell, Progress Report 2008: Enforcement of the OECD Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
(Berlin: Transparency International, 24 June 2008) at 18, online: <archive.transparency.org/
regional_pages/americas/conventions/report_card>.
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Calgary (the centre of Canada’s extractive industries and the corporate home of
many companies operating in high-risk jurisdictions). Its purpose was to focus
on detecting, investigating, and preventing international corruption (including
bribery, embezzlement, and laundering of the proceeds of crime), particularly in
the public sector. The two teams were coordinated and overseen by a dedicated
senior RCMP officer—the Officer in Charge of Sensitive Investigation and
International Corruption—a position established by the RCMP in 2005.113
The result was a predictable rise in Canadian enforcement activity. The latest
report to Parliament on Canada’s implementation of the OECD Convention,
tabled in February 2016, disclosed that the RCMP had twelve active CFPOA
investigations underway.114 This compares to twenty-seven investigations in
October 2014,115 and thirty-six active investigations at the time of the previous
report to Parliament in November 2013.116 While the 2016 report indicates
a decrease in active investigations, it is unclear whether this reflects an overall
decrease in enforcement resources dedicated to anti-corruption matters, or
a focus on fewer, larger and more complex investigations. Given that the
Canadian economy is one-tenth the size, these figures compare favourably with
the United States, where the number of active investigations is believed to be
between 83 and 150.117
Both federal and provincial Crown prosecutors can prosecute CFPOA
offences. However, since mid-2012, the RCMP appears to have taken a policy
decision to refer CFPOA matters exclusively to the Public Prosecution Service of
Canada (“PPSC”), which represents the federal Crown in criminal prosecutions.
The PPSC has designated senior counsel to coordinate CFPOA matters and in
113. Ibid at 4.
114. Global Affairs Canada, Sixteenth Annual Report to Parliament: Implementation of the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, and the Enforcement of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (4
February 2016), online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
topics-domaines/other-autre/corr-16.aspx?lang=eng> [Global Affairs Canada, Sixteenth
Annual Report].
115. Global Affairs Canada, Fifteenth Annual Report to Parliament: Implementation of the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, and the Enforcement of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act
(3 October 2014), online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
topics-domaines/other-autre/corr-15.aspx?lang=eng> [Global Affairs Canada, Fifteenth
Annual Report].
116. Global Affairs Canada, Fourteenth Annual Report, supra note 103.
117. Richard L Cassin, “The Corporate Investigations List (April 2016)” (5 April 2016),
The FCPA Blog (blog), online:<http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/4/5/
the-corporate-investigations-list-april-2016.html>.
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March 2014 issued a guideline that emphasized the importance of coordinating
the prosecution of CFPOA offences at a national level.118
In addition, over the same time period, two parallel trends converged to make
anti-corruption an important priority for the Canadian corporate community.
First, the fact that many of Canada’s largest companies are cross-listed on US
stock exchanges made them subject to the FCPA. Increasing enforcement in the
United States prompted US-listed Canadian companies to implement greater
compliance measures. Second, US purchasers’ and lenders’ potential FCPA
exposure led to more robust due diligence in acquisitions of Canadian companies
and in corporate finance involving US lenders. The next section presents an
overview of key milestones in Canada’s enforcement record to date.
A. THE EARLY YEARS: HYDRO-KLEEN

As noted above, there was little active enforcement of the CFPOA during the
first decade of its existence. The first case concluded in Canada involved illegal
payments of 28,299.88 CAD by Hydro Kleen Systems Inc. (“Hydro Kleen”) to
a US immigration official working at the Calgary International Airport.119 In
return for these payments, the official advised Hydro Kleen’s employees on how
to use work visas to obtain entry into the United States.120 Unbeknownst to the
company, the official also obstructed the entry of Hydro Kleen’s competitors’
personnel into the United States.121
The bribery scheme came to light due to complaints from a competitor
whose personnel were turned back at the Calgary airport.122 The competitor hired
a private investigator and turned over evidence to the RCMP, which pursued
the investigation and ultimately laid charges of bribery against the company,
its president, an employee, and the US official.123 The court fined Hydro
Kleen 25,000 CAD pursuant to a negotiated plea,124 and the charges against
the president and the employee were stayed.125 The US official was sentenced
to six months imprisonment on each count126 and was deported to the United
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

PPSC, “Corruption of Foreign Public Officials,” supra note 71 at 1-3.
R v Watts, [2005] AJ No 568 (QL) at para 20 (QB) [Hydro Kleen].
Ibid at paras 56-57.
Ibid at paras 61-64.
TRACE Anti-Bribery Compliance Solutions, “Trace Compendium: Hydro Kleen” (2015),
online: <www.traceinternational2.org/compendium/view.asp?id=128>.
Ibid. See also Hydro Kleen, supra note 119 at paras 41, 43.
Ibid at para 189.
Ibid at paras 82, 189.
R v Garcia, 2002 ABPC 156 at para 32, 325 AR 85.
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States.127 This light sentence and relatively minor fine indicated how far Canada
was from the kind of active enforcement seen in other jurisdictions, including
the United States.
B. THE SECOND WAVE: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS IN THE
PUBLIC EYE

Throughout the 2000s, Canada’s enforcement record remained bare, with the
Hydro Kleen prosecution being the only case prior to 2010. However, after
dedicated law enforcement resources were devoted to anti-corruption in 2008,
there was a noticeable upswing in enforcement activity. For example, in 2010,
the RCMP laid charges against Mr. Nazir Karigar under paragraph 3(1)(b) of
the CFPOA for allegedly making a payment to an Indian government official to
secure a multi-million dollar procurement contract for Cryptometrics, a Canadian
high-tech firm.128 These charges resulted in Canada’s first contested trial under
the CFPOA in 2013, as discussed below. In 2011, the RCMP executed a search
warrant against Blackfire Exploration, a junior Calgary-based mining company,
reportedly after receiving a complaint from mining watchdog NGOs.129 Also in
2011, the RCMP executed search warrants at the offices of SNC-Lavalin Group
Inc. in Oakville, Ontario in relation to its investigation into alleged corruption
in the World Bank-funded Padma Bridge project in Bangladesh.130 However,
notwithstanding the importance of these developments and the benefit of the
public having an opportunity to learn of them through RCMP press releases and
media coverage, there was little reason for most companies to suspect how high
the stakes were about to become.
In June 2011, Niko Resources Ltd. (“Niko”), a Canadian public company
in the oil and gas exploration sector, pleaded guilty to one count of bribery based
on events that occurred in 2005.131 The guilty plea was entered with an agreed
statement of facts in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, where Niko admitted
127. OECD, Phase 2 Follow-Up Report, supra note 86 at 26.
128. Karigar, Trial Decision, supra note 65 at paras 1-2.
129. Les Whittington & Brett Popplewell, “Mining watchdogs want probe,” The Toronto Star (10
March 2010), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2010/03/10/mining_watchdogs_
want_probe.html>.
130. See Greg McArthur, “RCMP raid Calgary miner over bribery allegations,” The Globe
and Mail (29 August 2011), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/
rcmp-raid-calgary-miner-over-bribery-allegations/article542841>. See also Ross Marowits,
“SNC-Lavalin faces new bribery allegations,” Metro (15 May 2013), online: <metronews.ca/
news/canada/673053/snc-lavalin-faces-new-bribery-allegations>.
131. Niko, supra note 63 at para 1.
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to having attempted to influence the then-Bangladeshi State Minister for Energy
and Mineral Resources by providing a vehicle for his personal use, valued at
190,984 CAD, and paying the travel costs for him to attend an Energy Expo in
Calgary and a subsequent personal trip to New York, valued at 5,000 CAD.132
These benefits were allegedly paid to obtain the minister’s support in relation to
the negotiation of a gas purchase and sale agreement with a state enterprise and
mitigation of the fallout resulting from a gas blowout at one of Niko’s sites in
Bangladesh.133 The RCMP learned of the potential CFPOA violations through
reports from DFAIT.134
The Crown was unable to prove that any influence was obtained as a result
of providing these benefits.135 Nonetheless, and notwithstanding the Crown’s
acknowledgement of Niko’s cooperation with the RCMP investigation and guilty
plea before charges were formally laid, Niko was sentenced to pay a significant
fine: 8.3 million CAD plus a fifteen per cent victim surcharge, for a total penalty
of 9.5 million CAD. In addition, Niko was subject to a significant probation
order, which required the company to undertake audits of its compliance with
anti-corruption laws under court supervision for three years.136 Indeed, the terms
of the order provide a roadmap for other companies looking to understand what
robust corporate anti-corruption compliance might look like.
Less than two years later, Canada would mark its second significant
prosecution. In January 2013, Griffiths Energy International Inc. (“Griffiths”)
entered a guilty plea on one count of bribery contrary to the CFPOA.137 Griffiths
admitted to having paid a two million CAD success fee to a company controlled
by the wife of the ambassador to Canada of the Republic of Chad in connection
with securing an oil and gas concession in the African country.138 The Crown did
not allege and Griffiths did not admit that any influence was actually realized as a
result of these payments.139 Indeed, when Griffiths’s new board and management
learned of the corrupt arrangements after a significant change in personnel at the

132. See R v Niko Resources Ltd (2011), 101 WCB (2d) 118, [2012] AWLD 4536 (QB) (Agreed
Statement of Facts at paras 4-5) [Niko, Agreed Statement of Facts].
133. Ibid at para 58.
134. Ibid at para 45.
135. Ibid at para 58.
136. Niko, supra note 63 at para 21.
137. Griffiths, supra note 64 at para 5.
138. Ibid at para 7.
139. R v Griffiths Energy International, [2013] AJ No 412 (QL) (QB) (Agreed Statement of Facts
at para 50) [Griffiths, Agreed Statement of Facts].
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top levels of the company, the new leadership undertook an internal investigation
and shared these results with the PPSC and RCMP.140
Griffiths was fined 9 million CAD plus a 15 per cent victim surcharge
for a total penalty of 10.35 million CAD.141 This significant fine was levied
notwithstanding the fact that the company voluntarily disclosed the matter to the
Canadian and US authorities when it came to the attention of new management
and cooperated fully in the RCMP investigation.142 In fact, the court’s reasons
suggest that the fine would have been considerably higher in the absence of the
voluntary disclosure and Griffiths’s cooperative conduct.143
Once underway, Canadian enforcement increased rapidly. There have
been two corporate convictions with substantial monetary penalties (Niko and
Griffiths), one individual convicted and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment
(Karigar), as well as the use of a variety of enforcement and investigative tools
in addition to the search warrants mentioned above—including the use of
anti-money laundering proceedings under the Criminal Code to seize assets
related to corruption; a grant of immunity to a corporate official in exchange for
providing evidence for prosecution under the CFPOA; the issuance of numerous
Criminal Code production orders by the courts in CFPOA cases; and formal
enforcement cooperation with the US Securities and Exchange Commission,
US Department of Justice, UK Serious Fraud Office, Swiss Attorney General,
and other foreign law enforcement agencies in international corruption cases,
including repeated use of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties.
C. TESTING THE CFPOA: KARIGAR AND PENDING SNC-LAVALIN CASES

Niko and Griffiths sent strong signals to the Canadian business community
that CFPOA enforcement was active and serious. However, because both cases
proceeded by way of what amounts to a negotiated settlement, no legal issues
came before the courts to test the limits and contours of the legislation. When
the first contested cases began to work their way through the courts in 2013
and 2014, Canadian judges started to have the opportunity to clarify significant
principles relevant to anti-corruption law in Canada.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Ibid at paras 41-43.
See Griffiths, supra note 64.
Ibid at paras 15-17.
Griffiths, Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 139 at paras 52-56.
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1.

R V KARIGAR—TRIAL AND SENTENCING DECISIONS

In June 2013, Nazir Karigar, a Canadian citizen, was found guilty of bribery
under the CFPOA for an agreement to pay bribes to certain officials of Air India
and the Indian Minister of Civil Aviation with regard to the procurement of an
airport security system. Mr. Karigar had acted as an agent for Cryptometrics
Canada, a Canadian technology company.144 In contesting the case against him,
Mr. Karigar argued that (1) the Crown had not adduced sufficient evidence
to establish the actus reus of the offence because the Crown failed to present
any evidence regarding the actual payment of sums to foreign public officials145
and (2) that Canada can only assert territorial jurisdiction over the matter if
there is a real and substantial connection between the essential elements of the
offence and Canada.146
With respect to the first issue, Justice Hackland of the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice concluded that the use of the verb “agree” in the phrase “agrees to
give or offer” in section 3(1) imports the concept of conspiracy into the CFPOA
such that an agreement by persons to give or offer a bribe to a foreign public
official is a violation of the Act, whether or not there is proof that the public
official was offered or received the bribe.147
With respect to the second issue, Justice Hackland concluded that the “real
and substantial connection” test does not require that all of the essential elements
of the offence have a substantial connection to Canada. Instead, Justice Hackland
analyzed the tainted transaction as a whole, noting that it included a Canadian
company and an agent (Mr. Karigar) who was for many years a Canadian business
resident.148 Although the “directing minds” of the corrupt transaction were based
in New York and the dealings with public officials occurred in India,149 at the
relevant time, Mr. Karigar was employed by the Canadian company and the
advantage that would have been obtained by the payment of bribes was for the
benefit of the Canadian company. Cryptometrics Canada would have been a
party to the contemplated procurement contract, and much of the work would
have been done by its employees in Ottawa.150
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Karigar, Trial Decision, supra note 65 at para 1.
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The Karigar interpretation is consistent with the earlier position taken by
Canada with respect to its implementation of the CFPOA that the “real and
substantial connection” test need not be interpreted so narrowly as to present a
barrier to the effective prosecution of CFPOA offences. The finding in Karigar is
important despite the introduction of nationality jurisdiction in 2013 since the
“real and substantial connection” test still applies to the activities of non-Canadian
companies and individuals for the purposes of the application of the CFPOA.
Following the trial and subsequent guilty verdict, Mr. Karigar was sentenced
to three years’ imprisonment in April 2014.151 In June 2014, the RCMP laid
charges against three foreign nationals believed to have assisted in the bribery
scheme, and Canada-wide warrants for these individuals remain outstanding.152
2.

SNC-LAVALIN: INVESTIGATIONS AND FIRST CHARGES

Corruption investigations into the activities of SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. (“SNC”)
have received a significant amount of media attention since the RCMP executed
a search warrant at SNC premises in September 2011 in relation to the Padma
Bridge construction project in Bangladesh.153 In addition to the Padma Bridge
project, SNC has been under investigation in relation to public contracts in Libya
as well as a high profile public construction project in Canada.154
In 2012, the RCMP arrested and charged two former SNC employees;
after a preliminary inquiry in April 2013, both individuals were committed to
stand trial, although the details of the case are subject to a publication ban.155
That same year, the RCMP charged a former senior vice-president of SNC and
two other individuals under the CFPOA in connection with the Padma Bridge

151. Karigar, Sentencing Decision, supra note 66 at para 37.
152. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Press Release, “RCMP Charge Individuals with Foreign
Corruption” (4 June 2014), online: <www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ottawa/ne-no/pr-cp/2014/0604corruption-eng.htm>; Global Affairs Canada, “Fifteenth Annual Report,” supra note 114.
153. Marowits, supra note 129.
154. See Graeme Hamilton, “RCMP charges SNC-Lavalin with fraud and corruption linked to
Libyan projects,” Financial Post (19 February 2015), online: <business.financialpost.com/
news/rcmp-charges-snc-lavalin-with-fraud-and-corruption-linked-to-libyan-projects>. See
also Tristin Hopper, “Federal agency boss took $1.5M in kickbacks from SNC-Lavalin
contract to restore Montreal bridge, report alleges,” National Post (13 February 2014), online:
<news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/federal-agency-boss-took-1-5m-in-kickbacks-fromsnc-lavalin-contract-to-restore-montreal-bridge-report>.
155. Global Affairs Canada, Fifteenth Annual Report, supra note 115. See also
Marowits, supra note 1.
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investigation.156 In April 2014, the Ontario Superior Court found that Canada
lacked adjudicative jurisdiction over one of these individuals, a Bangladeshi
national who was not present in Canada and who lacked any citizenship or
residency ties to Canada.157 Although Canadian courts may have jurisdiction
over the offence, unless and until the accused is physically present in Canada,
or Bangladesh offers to surrender him to Canada, Canadian courts do not
have jurisdiction over his person.158 Accordingly, the prosecution against the
Bangladeshi national has been stayed while the others continue. Prosecutions
and investigations also continue with respect to alleged payments to third parties
relating to public contracts in Libya; although charges have been laid, none of the
Libya-related matters has yet proceeded to trial.159
In February 2015, the RCMP laid fraud and corruption charges against SNC,
its division SNC-Lavalin Construction Inc., and its subsidiary SNC-Lavalin
International Inc.160

156. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Press Release, “RCMP Charge Former SNC Lavalin
Senior Executive” (18 September 2013), online: <www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ottawa/ne-no/
pr-cp/2013/0918-lavalin-eng.htm>. See also Global Affairs Canada, Fifteenth Annual Report,
supra note 114.
157. Chowdhury v Canada, 2014 ONSC 2635 at paras 6, 39, 52, 57, 309 CCC (3d) 447.
158. Ibid at para 54.
159. See Milos Barutciski, Matthew S Kronby & Sabrina A Bandali, “Canada Lays Corruption
and Fraud Charges Against SNC-Lavalin” (19 February 2015), Bennett Jones Thought
Network (blog), online: <blog.bennettjones.com/2015/02/19/canada-lays-corruptionfraud-charges-snc-lavalin>. In April 2012, the RCMP executed a search warrant at SNC
headquarters pursuant to a mutual legal assistance request by the Swiss authorities (ibid).
The Swiss authorities had arrested a former executive vice-president of SNC for money
laundering and corruption, and in August 2014, they reached a plea deal that saw the
executive plead guilty in October 2014 to bribery in exchange for the twenty-nine months of
incarceration he served and an order to repay millions of dollars to SNC (ibid). Two weeks
later, the executive was extradited to Canada, where he is expected to face prosecution of the
domestic corruption charges laid against him in relation to a large public construction project
in Quebec (ibid). In February 2014, the RCMP laid charges against a former executive
vice-president of construction and a former vice-president and financial controller in relation
to the Libya corruption allegations (ibid). In September 2014, the RCMP laid additional
charges against the former executive vice-president for obstructing justice and against a
Canadian lawyer for obstructing justice and extortion, alleging that the two men sought
to obtain a statement from the former executive vice-president detained in Switzerland in
exchange for money (ibid). See also Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Press Release, “Charges
Laid in Project Assistance” (10 September 2014), online: <www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ottawa/
ne-no/pr-cp/2014/0910-assistance-eng.htm>.
160. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Press Release, “RCMP Charges SNC-Lavalin” (19 February
2015), online: <www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ottawa/ne-no/pr-cp/2015/0219-lavalin-eng.htm>.
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IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCERNS
D. THE CHALLENGE FOR CANADIAN BUSINESS

As Canadian business looks to expand in new markets in the twenty-first
century, it is inevitable that companies will look to emerging markets. While
offering lucrative business opportunities, many developing countries suffer
from weak institutions and an uncertain commitment to the rule of law. This
is particularly acute in resource-rich regions where Canadian businesses have a
competitive advantage (e.g., mining and energy expertise). Canadian companies
are increasingly adopting more robust anti-corruption compliance policies to
respond to the scrutiny of international anti-corruption enforcement agencies
and to provide some initial protection in light of their obligations under the
CFPOA. However, this trend towards enhancing compliance mechanisms is still
in its early stages, and companies are prone to adopting formal measures rather
than establishing deeply-rooted compliance cultures.
Nonetheless, the increase in enforcement levels and awareness by businesses
and their legal and financial advisors is leading to significant changes in
compliance and transaction practices. These changes include more exacting
corruption-related representations and warranties, conditionality, covenants, and
indemnities in M&A and finance agreements; increasingly detailed due diligence
by buyers and lenders; more process-driven compliance mechanisms (reporting
and approval requirements); tighter internal controls as companies become more
familiar with the qualitative functions of enterprise software; and a growing
cadre of experienced Canadian specialist professionals (lawyers, accountants,
compliance professionals, and internal investigators).
Increasing enforcement by the RCMP prompts greater compliance efforts
by Canadian companies. So too does the need to satisfy capital markets that
the company business is sustainable and that potential foreign lenders, joint
venture partners, and acquirers will not be buying a liability when they invest in a
Canadian business. Canadian companies that are issuers in the United States are
also subject to the jurisdiction of US anti-corruption laws and potential criminal
and civil enforcement actions by the US Department of Justice or Securities and
Exchange Commission, respectively. Resource transparency initiatives, such as
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those undertaken by the United States,161 the European Union,162 and Canada,163
also dovetail with the evolution of compliance culture, particularly in the resource
sector. Similarly, public outrage at corruption-related scandals reported by the
media also contributes to greater corporate sensitivity to potential corruption
issues. However, Canadian businesses will also feel countervailing pressure as
they expand in more challenging markets and compete more frequently with
multinationals and SOEs from countries that do not have the same level of
commitment to anti-corruption enforcement. Thus, the same frustrations
that prompted the US business community to advocate for an international
anti-corruption agreement can similarly be expected to motivate peers in other
countries seeking to level the global playing field with respect to the supply side
of bribery transactions.
E.

LIMITATIONS OF THE OECD CONVENTION APPROACH AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS

As the above analysis indicates, Canada’s enforcement of the CFPOA has taken
on significant momentum since 2008 in addressing the supply side of bribery
transactions involving Canadian companies. However, the OECD Convention
and the laws inspired by it are not a complete solution to the issue of bribery
and corruption in international business. In the following section, we summarize
some of the limitations of the OECD Convention’s approach and possible
future directions.
First, the predominant focus on supply-side corruption is a significant
limitation to the effectiveness of the OECD Convention. Prominent signatories
did not view the OECD Convention as a final solution to bribery and corruption
in international business.164 Indeed, following the adoption of the OECD
Convention, the United States pursued demand-side initiatives, including the
encouragement of global norms and regional and bilateral efforts.165 Members
of the business community believed that the OECD Convention should have
161. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111-203, 124
Stat 1376 (2010).
162. EC, Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013
on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of
certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, [2013] OJ,
L182/19, art 44.
163. Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act, SC 2014, c 39.
164. Battling International Bribery, supra note 13 at vi-vii.
165. Ibid at vii.
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extended to “international bribery in the private sector and bribery of foreign
officials for purposes other than to obtain or retain business.”166 Moreover,
the composition of the international business community has significantly
changed. When the OECD Convention came into force in 1999, there were few
multinational corporations from outside the OECD countries. Today, leading
multinationals from China, Russia, India, Brazil, Malaysia, Indonesia, and many
other non-OECD countries compete vigorously in international business.
The OECD Convention’s scope is problematic. While non-OECD countries
are beginning to adopt foreign bribery laws, the record to date is still weak
and enforcement is virtually non-existent. As a result, one of the motivations
for the adoption of the OECD Convention—to level the playing field between
international companies—is under increasing pressure.
In addition, the OECD Convention fails to resolve the practical realities
faced by the international business community. No matter how sophisticated
the compliance systems are, business is not conducted in situations of perfect
control. When confronted with bribe solicitation or extortion by a corrupt
official, business executives are faced with a sharp dilemma: resist and jeopardize
the company’s business objectives or succumb and jeopardize the company’s (and
the executive’s own) legal exposure. Even if the company has a robust compliance
culture, resisting corrupt practices inevitably results in a significant diversion of
employee time and corporate resources. Instead of doing business, employees find
themselves spending time reporting to lawyers and compliance officers, filling out
due diligence forms, and assisting internal investigations. In addition to the effort
needed to maintain robust compliance, so long as the temptation to succumb
to a bribe solicitation in order to gain a business advantage exists, determined
individuals may succeed in circumventing internal controls, leading to both
potential liability and further investigative and compliance costs. Fundamentally,
companies face a continuing challenge of allocating scarce resources among
competing priorities and have to weigh the cost, benefits, and risks they face
when determining how robust they can afford their anti-corruption efforts to be.
This reality supports the position that there is a need to make greater efforts
to address demand-side corruption. A striking imbalance exists between the effort
and resources devoted to addressing supply-side and demand-side corruption.
While OECD Members have committed substantial resources to investigating
and prosecuting international bribery, they have devoted little to developing
mechanisms that will assist their companies when confronted with bribe
solicitation or extortion. Admonishing private enterprises to “just say no” and
166. OECD, Review of the 1994 Recommendation, supra note 40 at 10.
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pointing to the applicable laws is of little practical assistance. Some bodies, such
as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, have issued practical guides
that address demand-side issues, but these remain dependent on the willingness
of governments to address corruption internally.167
If the international community could reach a sustained consensus to address
the demand-side of bribery transactions as they have with supply-side corruption,
international mechanisms could be developed to assist companies trying to
behave ethically, furthering the gains made in the development of corporate
compliance efforts to date. What is needed is a menu of tools that would allow
companies confronted by corruption to obtain the international community’s
assistance in resisting such corruption without exposing their entire investment
in the host country to ransom. This challenge goes beyond the scope of criminal
law. We offer the following suggestions for future examination and development.
First, international organizations such as the UN and its various agencies
could explore the establishment of a high-level contact point for reports of bribe
solicitation and the development of a registry of official corruption. Similar to
the “name and shame” logic of peer-review systems used to assess legislative
compliance with and enforcement of international anti-corruption conventions,
such a registry could create an internationally-accessible record of historic country
risk based on bribe solicitations themselves.
Second, countries could explore the development of collective action
through a joint diplomatic mechanism that addresses persistent bribe
solicitations or endemic corruption. For example, there have been discussions
within the OECD, TI, the Business 20 summit, and other fora regarding the
establishment of a high-level reporting mechanism that would allow companies
faced with bribe solicitation or extortion to bring the matter to the attention
of high levels of government through an independent channel. This proposal
could also be extended and internationalized by enabling a multilateral forum
to respond to such allegations. The implementation of such a mechanism would
require a serious commitment on the part of the countries involved—at the very
highest level—to combating corruption and to protecting companies invoking
the procedure from retaliation.
Third, the OECD Convention and other international agreements encourage
states to adopt nationality-based jurisdiction over their companies’ international
conduct. A measure of symmetry would be provided by conferring limited
167. See e.g. UNODC, Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention against Corruption
(New York: UN, 2009), online: <www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Technical_
Guide_UNCAC.pdf>.
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jurisdiction on the bribe payer’s country over the bribe solicitor (i.e., the corrupt
foreign official). Although criminal jurisdiction is likely not feasible, including as
a result of international comity and sovereign equality, there may be other forms
of enforcement or jurisdiction that strike an appropriate balance. For example,
civil jurisdiction backed by banking and travel sanctions could be equally effective
if enforced multilaterally.
Finally, official corruption could be introduced as a cause of action in
international investment treaties. This would protect businesses that are committed
to ethical conduct by affording them a mechanism to seek redress for the loss of
business or other harm that may result from resisting a bribe solicitation.
These measures may not be easy to develop or implement and may not
garner an international consensus any time soon. However, there is ample
scope for international efforts against demand-side corruption just as there was
against supply-side corruption. Moreover, unless the demand-side is addressed,
the achievements on the supply-side may well risk being eroded over time, to
everyone’s detriment.
The focus on supply-side corruption has led to important results evidenced by
the substantial resources committed to corporate compliance, training, internal
controls, and internal investigations. Robust compliance policies and internal
controls impose costs that go beyond the direct costs of their implementation.
However, they also impose transaction costs indirectly through the diversion
of management’s attention away from business decision making and through
the delays caused by the adherence to formal compliance obligations such as
due diligence and reporting. Companies incur these costs even where the risks
are less significant or non-existent. At the same time, even the most robust
compliance regimes can be circumvented if the incentives are high enough
and the circumventers devote sufficient effort. As in all areas of public policy,
it is important to make sure that limited resources are allocated efficiently. The
effort devoted to fighting supply-side corruption will ultimately result in a
misallocation of scarce resources and a reversal of its results, unless it is matched
by an equivalent effort on the demand side.

